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Abstract
Deploying mobile edge computing (MEC) server in the mobile blockchain-enabled Internet of
things (IoT) system is a promising approach to improve the system performance, however, it imposes a
significant challenge on the trust of MEC server. To address this problem, we first propose an untrusted
MEC proof of work scheme in mobile blockchain network where plenty of nonce hash computing
demands can be offloaded to MEC server. Then, we design a nonce ordering algorithm for this scheme to
provide fairer computing resource allocation for all mobile IoT devices/users. Specifically, we formulate
the user’s nonce selection strategy as a non-cooperative game, where the utilities of individual user are
maximized in the untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain network. We also prove the existence of
Nash equilibrium and analyze that the cooperation behavior is unsuitable for the blockchain-enabled
IoT devices by using the repeated game. Finally, we design the blockchain’s difficulty adjustment
mechanism to ensure stable block times during a long period of time.
Index Terms
Mobile edge computing, blockchain, IoT, nonce ordering, non-cooperative game
I. INTRODUCTION
As an emerging frontier technology, blockchain has received increasing attention in recent
years. The success of the blockchain concept is ultimately connected with Bitcoin [1]. Blockchain
technology is not only limited in Bitcoin, but also used in many communication areas, such
as Internet of things (IoT) [2]–[7], edge computing [8]–[12], spectrum sharing [13], [14] and
Y. Zuo and S. Jin are with the National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096,
China (e-mail: zuoyiping@seu.edu.cn; jinshi@seu.edu.cn).
S. Zhang is the College of Information Engineering, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China (e-mail: zsl@szu.edu.cn)
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
08
25
5v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
19
2interference management [15]. The security and reliability of blockchain are mainly determined
by the distributed consensus mechanisms, for example, proof of work (PoW) mining mechanism
(see Section II-A for details) for Bitcoin system [16], proof of stake for Ethereum [17] and so on.
In essence, blockchain is a tamper-proofing and distributed database, which records transactional
data without the requisition of a trusted authority or central server in the peer-to-peer (P2P)
network.
Although blockchain has many advantages, heavy equipments and fixed access points have
become shortcomings of the traditional blockchain network, which can limit its further devel-
opment. To tackle this problem, mobile blockchain with large-scale IoT devices [3] would be a
better choice in the future. Nevertheless, IoT devices have poor privacy, security and scalability.
Fortunately, the emergence of blockchain technology creates opportunities to overcome the afore-
mentioned drawbacks. The research on mobile IoT devices deployed in the mobile blockchain
network is emerging. Recently, some researches on the combination of blockchain and IoT
technologies have been published [4]–[7]. Specifically, authors in [5] had a systematic survey on
IoT security and proposed that the frontier blockchain technology has enormous potentials as the
solution scheme. [6] has investigated synchronization protocols with different communication
costs and security levels, which synchronize mobile IoT users with the blockchain network.
Blockchain technology provides a distributed architecture for coordinating IoT devices, whereas
it is not feasible to store the full blockchain ledger for low-power and memory-constrained IoT
devices. Thus authors have proposed a lightweight software scheme, where IoT devices only
download useful data structures in [7].
The above researches improved the system performance to some extent. Nevertheless, mo-
bile blockchain network is constrained by consuming too much hash computing, storage, and
energy resources during the mining process on mobile IoT devices. It is unable to satisfy some
characteristics of IoT devices with relatively low computing ability, low power consumption,
and scattered low-bandwidth wireless connections. Instead, mobile edge computing (MEC) is a
network architecture concept that implements cloud computing capabilities and an IT service
environment at any network edge [18]–[20]. So MEC can supply these resources for mobile
blockchain-enabled IoT devices. Deploying MEC server in the mobile blockchain network is
a feasible way to handle the low computing power dilemma [8]–[12]. In particular, the PoW
mining process focuses on finding a correct nonce for solving PoW puzzle. While it is unrealistic
for mobile IoT users to continuously run such a computation-intensive mining task, which
3requires high computing ability and consumes substantial energy and time. Due to the prominent
characteristics of MEC server, such as low latency, high mobility, and wide regional distribution,
we consider to offload the blockchain mining tasks to MEC server.
Currently, there is substantial interest in investigating computation offloading in the mobile
blockchain network with MEC server. For example, prior works in [8], [9] have formulated
the interaction between MEC server and users as the two-stage Stackelberg game in the mobile
blockchain network. The Stackelberg equilibrium ensures that MEC server maximizes its revenue.
Alternatively, it is also significant to maximize the profit of mobile users. Auction schemes in
[10]–[12] are the feasible solutions to accomplish this goal. The work in [10] has investigated
an auction-based MEC system model to maximize the revenue of mobile users. Essentially, the
auction of the edge computing service is an optimization problem, which tackle the biggest profit
of users. This optimization problem is a nonlinear programming problem with linear constraints,
which is NP-hard. Authors in [11] have applied the approximate fractional relaxation and local
search (FRLS) method to ensure a lower bound. Whereas MEC server cannot achieve optimal
auction by using traditional single-item auctions. An optimal single-item auction for the edge
computing resource allocation was developed via a multi-layer neural network architecture based
on an analytical solution of the optimal auction in [12]. Another line of research takes content
cashing and different offloading modes into consideration [21]–[23], because PoW consensus
mechanism of blockchain also requires to spend lots of storage resources in the mining process.
To tackle this problem, the work in [21] has considered that computationally difficult mining
task can be offload to nearby edge computing nodes and transactional content of blocks can be
cached in the MEC server. This paper has proposed two offload modes, offloading to the nearby
access point (AP) or a group of nearby D2D devices. In addition, the research in [22] has also
considered the advanced multi-access MEC server in the mobile blockchain network.
In these previous researches, many works have investigated the resource allocation of MEC
server in a mobile blockchain network with the assumption that MEC is a trusted server. However,
in this case, MEC server will have an opportunity to profit from the usage of information of
IoT users. It is likely that MEC server will allocate more computing resources to some selfish
users so as to obtain more revenue. Generally speaking, if MEC is a trusted server, it may lead
to unfair computing resource allocation for mobile users and also increase the possibility of
malicious collusion between MEC server and selfish users. To the best of authors’ knowledge,
few works focus on untrusted MEC servers in the mobile blockchain network. Moreover, the
4previous works treated the mining task as a general computing demand, which really reflect the
characteristics of the blockchain mining task. In this paper, different from previous works, we
consider an untrusted MEC PoW scheme and specially design a nonce ordering algorithm for
the scheme. In the untrusted MEC PoW framework, user’s nonce selection strategy is formulated
as a non-cooperative game, where the utilities of individual user are maximized. Meanwhile, we
design a blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism for keeping network stable.
In this paper, we intend to obtain insights into users’ nonce selection strategies and blockchain’s
difficulty adjustment mechanism in the proposed untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain net-
work. The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
1) We propose an untrusted MEC PoW scheme and a nonce ordering algorithm to provide
fairer nonce computing resource allocation for all mobile IoT users. For any mobile user,
such ordering algorithm guarantees that the probability of successfully mining a new block
corresponding to other users is proportional to its nonce length.
2) Based on Theorem 1, we formulate the user’s nonce selection strategy as a non-cooperative
game, in which the utilities of individual user are maximized. We analyze the Nash equi-
librium (NE) existence in this game and propose an alternating optimization algorithm of
users’ nonce selection. Furthermore, we drive the NE in analytical expression which only
needs to know partial information of other users and analyze that cooperation is unsuitable
for the blockchain-enabled IoT devices in the repeated game.
3) We design the blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism to keep block times stable
during a long period of time. The mean and variance of rounds for mining G blocks
are derived. Moreover, the adjustment rule of difficulty factor is to minimize the distance
between the average rounds for G blocks and the predefined threshold.
4) Simulation results verify the effectiveness of our proposed nonce ordering algorithm under
the untrusted MEC PoW scheme. Then we demonstrate that the expected optimal user’s
nonce selection strategy is influenced by multiple system parameters jointly, such as the
block size, the fixed reward for successfully, the transaction fee rate, etc. In addition, the
design of blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism achieves a good performance over
a long period of time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the PoW mining process
and system model of MEC-aided mobile blockchain network. Section III represents our proposed
5untrusted MEC PoW scheme and nonce ordering algorithm. Section IV formulates user’s selec-
tion strategy problem, designs blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism and affords some
theoretical analysis. Simulations are presented in Section V to confirm the analytical results. At
last, we conclude the main results of the work in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we will introduce the background on PoW mining mechanism in the Bitcoin
network and MEC system model of edge computing resource allocation for mobile blockchain
network.
A. PoW Mining Mechanism
As a matter of fact, PoW mining mechanism is to prevent low-computing malicious entities
from publishing blocks arbitrarily. To obtain the billing power, nodes in the network have to
construct a block in advance and select some unconfirmed transaction records into a new block.
Then, each node solves the PoW puzzle, making the hash value of the block header smaller than
the blockchain’s target value by changing nonces randomly. The input of the hash function is
the block header and the output is a 256-bit hash value. This process of solving PoW puzzle is
called mining. Once the PoW puzzle is resolved, the newly mined block will be immediately
announced to the whole blockchain network. Meanwhile, the other nodes receive this information
and execute a validating process to decide whether to approve and add a newly generated block
to the blockchain or not. Each extension of this block is equivalent to an additional confirmation
of the transaction in the block. If getting 6 confirmations, the block is approved by the whole
network and encapsulated in the historical block. The miner which successfully mines a new
block will achieve a certain number of reward, including a fixed bonus and a variable transaction
fee, as an incentive of mining.
The Bitcoin system will control the completion time of mining a new block in about 10
minutes. If the block time is less than 10 minutes, the Bitcoin system will automatically increase
the difficulty value and the number of 0 at the beginning of the target hash value. Oppositely,
if the block time is higher than 10 minutes, the number of 0 at the beginning of the target hash
value is appropriately reduced to obtain a lower difficulty value. To simplify the explanation, let
H (·) denote the hash function which uses a cryptographic algorithm to generate a short summary
from any size of data. X denotes block header information, such as version, the hash value of
6the previous block, Merkle root and so on. Given an adjustable hardness condition parameter h,
the process of PoW puzzle solution aims to search a correct nonce to be included in the block.
The target hash value of block header bh which concatenates X and nonce is smaller than a
target value V (h):
bh = H (X||nonce) ≤ V (h) , (1)
where we have V (h) = 2L−h = 2
L
D(h)
, L denotes the fixed length of bits, determining the
searching space of the hash function, i.e., all nonce ∈ [0, 2L − 1], and D(h) is blockchain’s
difficulty value.
B. MEC System Model
The mobile blockchain network is constrained because the mining process demands too much
computing, storage, and energy resource on mobile IoT devices. Instead, MEC server can supply
these resources for mobile blockchain-enabled IoT devices. We only consider computing re-
sources in this paper. Fig. 1 depicts the system model of MEC-aided mobile blockchain network,
which includes single MEC and N mobile IoT devices/users running blockchain application
denoted as N = {1, ..., N}. Due to the computing limitation on mobile IoT devices, users want
to offload the task of solving the PoW puzzle to MEC server. Besides, all mobile IoT users
send requests to MEC server in a time slot. Previous researches on the MEC server in a mobile
MEC Server
IoT Device/User 2
IoT Device/User 1 IoT Device/User N
Blockchain
Offloading
Fig. 1. Edge computing in the mobile blockchain network.
blockchain network have the assumption that MEC is a trusted server. If MEC is a trusted server,
7it may lead to unfair computing resource allocation for mobile users and increase the possibility
of malicious collusion between MEC server and selfish users. Consequently, we consider an
untrusted MEC server in this paper and focus on designing a reasonable allocation mechanism
to make computing resource allocation fairer for all users.
On the other hand, each user independently selects nonces for hash computing because the
block content of each user is different. Even though each user chooses the same nonce, the
corresponding hash is different (if the SHA-256 hash function is used, then all nonce ∈ [0, 232]).
For mobile IoT devices, the computation-intensive mining demand is too high. Given the cost of
renting MEC’s service and mining time, the final user’s revenue can be reduced or even negative.
Thus we assume that each user only chooses some nonces to do hash computing.
With the combination of above analysis, we put forward an untrusted MEC PoW scheme and
design a nonce ordering algorithm for this mobile blockchain network. The detailed process of
this new scheme is described in the following Section III.
III. UNTRUSTED MEC POW SCHEME
In this section, we focus on the untrusted MEC PoW scheme in the mobile blockchain network.
We design a nonce ordering algorithm for this scheme to achieve fairer hash computation resource
of MEC server for all mobile IoT users.
A. General Process of the Untrusted MEC PoW
Selected nonces of each user are open and transparent in the whole network so that it can
reduce the cheating possibility by the untrusted MEC server. Then MEC server provides hash
computing service to these nonces. Mobile IoT user i randomly selects a part of nonces as
own computing demand by vector mi for i = 1, 2, ..., N and the nonce number/length of mi is
denoted as Mi = |mi|. Without loss of generality, nonces in the sequence mi are ordered from
small to large by mi =
{
mi1,m
i
2, ...,m
i
Mi
}
, where mif is the element of mi for f = 1, 2, ...,Mi.
The MEC server, i.e., the seller, sells the computing services, and the users, i.e., the buyers,
access and consume this service from the nearby MEC. All users submit their nonce sequence
demand profile m = {m1,m2, ...,mN} to MEC server. Next, we represent the general process
of the untrusted MEC PoW scheme as follows.
8After having received users’ computation demands, the MEC server provides the hash comput-
ing service and achieves payment from all mobile IoT users. We introduce the detailed interaction
process between MEC server and users in the untrusted MEC PoW scheme as follows.
• Step 1: Users select nonces. Each mobile user randomly selects some nonces as its own
computing demand.
• Step 2: Submit tasks to MEC. All mobile users submit their mining tasks, i.e., the nonce
hash computing demand profile m to MEC server.
• Step 3: MEC accepts the tasks. The MEC server accepts mining tasks for the users who
arrive in a time slot and those users arriving after this time slot are not accepted. We assume
that N users submit the nonce sequences to the MEC server for hash computing in a time
slot.
• Step 4: Nonce ordering. Since MEC is an untrusted server, it is necessary to order nonces
before providing mobile users with the computing service, so that MEC provides the
computing service to users as fair and transparent as possible. The ordering algorithm
adopted in this paper is introduced below (see Section III-B ).
• Step 5: MEC provides services. The MEC server provides the computing service and
receives payment from users. Once a user has coped with the PoW puzzle, MEC server
will stop all tasks immediately and announce the result to all mobile IoT users. Then a new
round of computing resource allocation will begin.
B. Nonce Ordering
The following work highlights that how to order users’ nonces on the MEC server for providing
users computing services fairly, that is, how to map multiple nonce sequences into a sequence.
We introduce this ordering algorithm for the untrusted MEC PoW scheme as follow: Firstly,
each user’s nonces have a local order from small to large, i.e., mi1 < m
i
2 < ... < m
i
Mi
for i =
1, 2, ..., N . The original N sequences are denoted m1,m2, ...,mN . We use another N sequences,
w1, w2, ..., wN to denote the nonces selected from the corresponding original sequences to the
merged sequence. Initially, the sequence wi is empty for i = 1, 2, .., N . As showed in Fig. 2, the
untrusted MEC server selects the top nonce in each user’s nonce sequence as the alternative set
into candidate pool. We intend to design a fairer nonce ordering algorithm to select a nonce in
each round. Then the remaining nonces in the previous round are taken as elements of the next
round into candidate pool. We desire that N nonce sequences are merged into one sequence as
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Fig. 2. The nonce ordering for the untrusted MEC server. N original nonce sequences can be
mapped into a merged sequence according to an ordering algorithm, which selects one nonce
in each round of nonce ordering, then the remaining nonces in the previous round are treated
as elements of the next round into candidate pool. Finally, the untrusted MEC server provides
hash computing service for this merged nonce sequence.
shown in Fig. 2. The objective of our ordering algorithm is that for any position in the merged
sequence, the number of selected nonces of each original sequence is proportional to its nonce
length. So the target probability of being served for user i is
pi =
Mi∑
j∈N
Mj
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (2)
and the target probability mass is P = {p1, p2, ..., pN}. Suppose the length of sequence mi is
li and the length of sequence wi is ki. In each round of nonce ordering, a nonce of each
original sequence is selected to the candidate pool as shown in Fig. 2, and then a nonce is
randomly selected among these N nonces to the merged sequence. The index of the round is
denoted as n and the lengths of sequence mi and sequence wi are li (n) = li (n− 1) − 1 and
ki (n) = ki (n− 1) + 1 respectively. We calculate the expected winning probability of being
served for user i, suppose it to be qi = ki/
∑
j∈N kj and the expected winning probability mass
is Q = {q1, q2, ..., qN}. In each round of nonce ordering, the top nonce of the i-th sequence mi
is selected, so that there will be the distance between probability mass P and Qi, where Qi the
expected winning experience probability distribution of user i for i = 1, 2, ..., N . In this case,
10
the two probability distributions can be rewritten by
P =
 M1∑
j∈N
Mj
,
M2∑
j∈N
Mj
, ...,
MN∑
j∈N
Mj
 , for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (3)
Qi =
 k1∑
j∈N
kj + 1
, ...,
ki + 1∑
j∈N
kj + 1
, ...,
kN∑
j∈N
kj + 1
 , for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (4)
We will take a look at the way of comparing two probability distributions called Kullback-
Leibler(KL) divergence. Next, we offer the definition of KL divergence as follows.
Definition 1. If we have two separate probability distributions Q(M) and P (M) over the same
random variable M , we can measure the difference between the two distributions using the KL
divergence:
DKL (Q ‖P )
= EM∼Q
[
log
Q (M)
P (M)
]
= EM∼Q [logQ (M)− logP (M)] .
(5)
We have a target probability distribution P and wish to approximate it with another expect
winning probability distribution Qi, so that the probability of selecting each nonce for all users
is fairer for i = 1, 2, ..., N . The KL divergence between the two probability distributions P and
Qi is as follows,
DKL (Qi ‖P )
=
N∑
i=1
qi log
qi
pi
= log
∑
j∈N
Mj∑
j∈N
kj + 1
−
 N∑
j=1,j 6=i
 kj∑
j∈N
kj + 1
log
Mj
kj
 + ki + 1∑
j∈N
kj + 1
log
Mi
ki + 1
 .
(6)
By convention, in the context of information theory, we treat these expressions as limki→0 ki log ki =
0, for i = 1, 2, ..., N . We have the choice of minimizing DKL (Qi ‖P ) by
i∗ = arg min
i
DKL (Qi||P ) , for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (7)
So the i∗-th user’s top nonce is selected to the merged sequence1. We use the similar selecting
rule as (7) to select nonces to enter into the merged sequence, then multiple users’ nonce
1If there are more than one nonce choices, we select one randomly in this case.
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Algorithm 1 Ordering Algorithm for the Untrusted MEC PoW Scheme
1: Initialization: input N original nonce sequences m1, m2, ..., mN .
2: repeat
3: for i = 1 to N do
4: Select one nonce from the mi sequence, calculate Qi by the equation (4).
5: Then calculate the KL divergence between P and Qi using the equation (6).
6: end for
7: In each round, select one nonce into a merged sequence by the rule (7).
8: until all nonces of N original sequences are mapped into a merged sequence.
sequences can be mapped into a sequence. Eventually, combining the above analysis part, the
nonce ordering algorithm for the untrusted MEC PoW scheme can be obtained, as summarized
in Algorithm 1.
To analyze the performance of this untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain network system,
we want to provide a mining probability for each user corresponding to other users in the
following theorem under the above-proposed ordering algorithm.
Theorem 1. For any mobile user i, the probability of successfully mining a new block corre-
sponding to other users is nearest to this target probability:
Pmi =
Mi∑
i∈N
Mi
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (8)
Proof. We prove this theorem by using reduction to absurdity. We assume that the i-th mobile
user’s probability of successfully mining a new block corresponding to other users, i.e., the
probability of the untrusted MEC server providing nonce hash computing service in the merged
sequence, is not nearest to the target probability pi under above proposed ordering algorithm.
Under this assumption, it is easy to obtain that the i-th mobile user’s nonces in the merged
sequence obviously cannot satisfy the nonce selecting rule (7) of our proposed ordering al-
gorithm. Meanwhile, the selecting rule (7) requires that each selected nonce has the smallest
KL divergence between the expected winning probability and target probability distribution,
namely, the expected winning probability approximates the target probability. When the total
nonce length approaches infinity, the user’s successful mining probability is almost equal to the
target probability. Nevertheless, it directly contradicts our current assumption that the i-th mobile
12
user’s probability of successfully mining a new block is not nearest to the target probability.
Hence, the statement in this theorem is proved.
Remark 1. (Property of Theorem 1): Our proposed nonce ordering algorithm in the untrusted
MEC PoW scheme achieves better fairness of computing resource allocation among all mobile
IoT users. For any position in the merged sequence of the untrusted MEC server, the number of
selected nonces of each original sequence is proportional to its nonce length.
Previous researches have the assumption that MEC is a trusted server, resulting in many
problems. For example, when multiple users submit mining task requests to a trusted MEC,
users will inform the MEC server of all their information. This will offer MEC an opportunity
to profit from the usage of this information, and it is likely that the MEC server will allocate
more computing resources to some selfish users in order to obtain more revenue. Generally
speaking, if the MEC is a trusted server, it may lead to unfair computing resource allocation for
mobile users and also increase the possibility of malicious collusion between MEC server and
selfish users. Accordingly, our proposed nonce ordering algorithm in the untrusted MEC PoW
scheme is more reasonable and implement fairer computing resource distribution of MEC server
among all IoT users in the mobile blockchain network.
IV. SYSTEM FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present the non-cooperative game formulation for the mobile users’
nonce selection strategy in the untrusted MEC PoW scheme. Then we analyze the NE existence
of this game and propose an alternating optimization algorithm for users’ nonce selection. We
also derive the NE in analytical expression which only needs to know partial information of
other users. Furthermore, we analyze that cooperation behavior is unsuitable for the blockchain-
enabled IoT devices by using the repeated game. In the end, we design the difficulty adjustment
process for the untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain network in detail.
A. Non-cooperative Game Formulation
In the PoW mining process, users compete to be first to solve the PoW puzzle with right nonce
and broadcast the block to reach agreement in the whole blockchain network. We describe the
size of transaction (TX) of each user by s = (s1, ..., sN). The first user which successfully mines
a block and achieves agreement can get a reward F . The reward is composed of a fixed bonus
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B for mining a new block and a flexible transaction fee determined by the size of its collected
transactions s and the transaction fee rate r. Then mobile user i’s expected reward Fi can be
expressed by
Fi = (B + rsi)P
m
i , for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (9)
where Pmi is the probability that user i receives the reward by contributing a block to the
blockchain corresponding to other users. From the nonce ordering algorithm above mentioned,
the probability of mining a new block is proportional to user i’s nonce length, i.e., Pmi =
Mi/
∑
j∈N Mj , for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
The untrusted MEC-aided blockchain network system discussed in this paper has only one
MEC server. There is no fork and the orphaning probability will not be considered. While
equation (9) does not reflect the effect of blockchain’s difficulty on the mining process. Even
though all users’ nonces are provided hash computing service by MEC server, the block will
not be mined successfully. Nonce hash computing is a memoryless searching process, and the
searching probability is only related to the difficulty value D(h), regardless of the size of this
searching space. For a given difficulty value D(h), each nonce hash computing is i.i.d Bernoulli
trial with a successful probability
PD =
1
D (h)
= 2−h. (10)
With this effect in mind, our equation for the i-th user’s expected revenues gets discounted by
the chances of blockchain’s difficulty value, PD, becoming
Fi = (B + rsi) 2
−h Mi∑
j∈N
Mj
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (11)
Once receiving computing resource demands from all mobile users, MEC server will provide
hash computing service for mobile users’ nonce sequence, and finally finds the correct nonce
for mining. Here, we assume the price of each hash computing for the MEC is fixed by c. The
users compete with each other to maximize their own utility by choosing their individual nonce
computing demand, which forms the non-cooperative game G = (N,M, ui (·)) as follows:
Player: the N mobile users;
Actions: each player selects some nonces and corresponding i-th user’s nonce length denoted
as Mi;
Utility function: the utility function ui is denoted as the i-th user’s revenue.
The revenue of i-th user is that the achieved rewards minus computing service cost of MEC
14
server. Given the price of once hash computing c, the user i determines its nonce hash computing
service demand by maximizing the expected utility function which is given as:
ui (Mi) = (B + rsi) 2
−h Mi∑
j∈N
Mj
− cMi, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (12)
B. NE Analysis of the Non-cooperative Game
We consider this non-cooperative game Nash equilibrium (NE) as a solution to the users’
nonce selection strategies. In this case, the NE is obtained by using the best response function
which is the best strategy of one player given other users’ strategies. The best response function
of i-th user’s nonce selection, given a vector of strategies offered by other users’ nonce selection
M−i, is defined as follows:
Ri (M−i) = arg max
Mi
u (Mi,M−i) , (13)
where M−i = (M1,M2, ...,Mi−1,Mi+1, ...,MN) for i = 1, 2, ..., N . The vector M∗ = (· · ·Mi∗ · · ·)
denotes a NE of this game on nonce selection for
M∗i = Ri
(
M∗−i
)
, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N, (14)
where M∗−i denotes the vector of best responses for player j for j 6= i. The above variable
Mi has the non-negative integer constraint, making ui become a mixed integer programming
function. Here, we remove the integer restriction and solve the optimal nonce selection strategy
directly, and then get the integer solution by rounding down to nearest integer. We next analyze
the existence of NE in the noncooperative game (N,M, ui (·)).
Theorem 2. A NE exists in the noncooperative game (N,M, ui (·)).
Proof. First of all, the strategy space for each user is defined to be [0, 2L − 1], which is a non-
empty, convex, compact subset of the Euclidean space. From (12), it is easier to treat discrete
functions ui as continuous functions in [0, 2L − 1]. Then we take the first order and second order
derivatives of (12) with Mi to prove its concavity, which can be written as follows
∂ui (Mi)
∂Mi
= (B + rsi) 2
−h
∑
M−i
(Mi +
∑
M−i)
2 − c, (15)
∂ui
2 (Mi)
∂Mi
2 = (B + rsi) 2
−h −2
∑
M−i
(Mi +
∑
M−i)
3 < 0, (16)
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for i = 1, 2, ..., N , and where −2
∑
M−i
(Mi+
∑
M−i)3
< 0. Hence we have proved that ui is strictly concave
with respect to Mi. Accordingly, the NE exists (see [24]-Theorem 3.2) in the non-cooperative
game (N,M, ui (·)). The proof is now completed.
Mathematically, to obtain the NE, we have to address the following set of equations:
∂ui (M)
∂Mi
= (B + rsi) 2
−h
∑
M−i
(Mi +
∑
M−i)
2 − c = 0, (17)
for all i = 1, 2, ..., N . Then we can obtain the best response function of user i by solving (17)
M∗i =
√∑
M−i (B + rsi)
c · 2h −
∑
M−i, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (18)
The solution M∗i , which is a NE, can be obtained by solving the above set of linear equations
by using a numerical method when all the parameters in (18) are available. We see other users’
nonce selection strategies as an integrated part. Assume other parameters such as B, r, si, c, h
are fixed, then we get the first order and second order derivatives of (18) with
∑
M−i, which
can be written as follows
∂M∗i
∂ (
∑
M−i)
=
1
2
√
(B + rsi)
c · 2h
(∑
M−i
)− 1
2 − 1, for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (19)
and
∂2M∗i
∂(
∑
M−i)
2 = −
1
4
√
(B + rsi)
c · 2h
(∑
M−i
)− 3
2
< 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (20)
Hence we easily obtain that the i-th user’s best response M∗i is strictly concave with respect
to other users’ nonce selection strategies. In the first place, M∗i increases with the increment of∑
M−i, and then reaching an optimal point, it decreases when
∑
M−i increases. This conclusion
is also consistent with the subsequent simulation result of Fig. 6. At last, combining the above
analysis part, the optimal users’ nonce selection under the untrusted MEC PoW scheme can be
obtained, as summarized in Algorithm 2. From (18), we can see that the selected nonce numbers
of all other users are known and it is apparently difficult to apply in the actual system. For this
reason, the best response function can be rewritten in the analytical expression of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The NE for user i in the noncooperative game (N,M,ui (.)) is given by
M∗i =
N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
−
 N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj

2
c · 2h
B + rsi
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (21)
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Algorithm 2 Alternating Optimization Algorithm of Users’ Nonce Selection
1: Initialization: input data (B, r, si, c, L, h), set i = 1 and choose M−1 ∈
[
0, 2L − 1].
2: repeat
3: Fix M−i = (M1,M2, ...,Mi−1,Mi+1, ...,MN), and calculate M∗i using (18).
4: i← i+ 1
5: Then update the set M−i =(M1,M2, ...,M∗i−1, Mi+1, ...,MN).
6: until the optimal nonce vector M∗ = {M∗1 ,M∗2 , ...,M∗N} is obtained.
Proof. According to (17), for each user i, we have the mathematical expression∑
M−i
(Mi +
∑
M−i)
2 =
c · 2h
B + rsi
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (22)
Then we calculate the summation of this expression (22) for all users as follows
N − 1
Mi +
∑
M−i
=
∑
j∈N
c · 2h
B + rsj
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (23)
we can obtain
Mi +
∑
M−i =
N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (24)
By substituting (24) into (18), we can have
N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
=
√√√√√√B + rsic · 2h
 N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
−Mi
, for i = 1, 2, ..., N. (25)
After squaring both sides and simple transformations, we can obtain the NE for user i as shown
in (21).
Remark 2. (Properties of Theorem 3): The analytical expression (21) is distinct from (18), which
needs to know the global information about other users. But the analytical expression (21) only
has to know the partial information such as the block size and the number of other users.
For ease of analysis, the above Mi is considered to be a continuous variable value. Whereas
the i-th user’s optimal nonce length M∗i is non-negative integer in real system. Then the formula
(21) is rounded down to obtain
M∗i =
 N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
−
 N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj

2
c · 2h
B + rsi
 . (26)
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Fig. 3. User access probability versus the number of users. B = 104, r = 2, c = 0.001 and
h = 12.
Remark 3. (Interpretation of formula (26)): From (26), M∗i is related to some parameters of
this mobile blockchain system, such as N , B, h and so on. From the perspective of analyzing
M∗i , the following cases will occur in the untrusted MEC PoW scheme.
Case 1: When M∗i ≤ 0 for no one user. We can see that N users all participate in the mobile
blockchain network for mining block, i.e., the number of users N is unchanged, and the values
of the system parameters are all appropriate in this case.
Case 2: When M∗i ≤ 0 for part users. Some users will quit the mobile blockchain system, because
the system parameters are inappropriate. From the formula (26), we can see that possible reasons
result in quitting system for some users, for instance, the total number of user is too large, the
mining revenue of user is too small, or the blockchain difficulty factor is too large. Once system
parameters N, b, r, h, c are fixed, the users having larger block sizes will be reserved, and the
users having smaller block sizes will be exited. After some users exit the mobile blockchain
system, we still need to continue to calculate the optimal nonce selection strategies for the
remaining users.
Case 3: When M∗i ≤ 0 for all N users. All users exit from the mobile blockchain system for
mining, leading to the entire system crashing dramatically. The system parameters are unsuitable
exceedingly, such as the total number of user too much large, the mining revenue of user too
much small, the blockchain difficulty factor too much large. In this case, an incentive mechanism
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should be designed to activate the system.
To demonstrate the effect of system parameters on user access for three cases, we compare
the user access probabilities for different users by changing the fixed reward for successfully
mining B and the difficulty factor h in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) respectively. From Fig. 3, we can
see that when N is small, the all users can access the mobile blockchain system to participate
in mining block (Case 1); when N is large, some users will quit our system (Case 2 or Case
3). The reasons are given as follows. As observed from Fig. 3(a), the user access probability
decreases with the declining fixed reward B. This is because as B reduces, each user can get less
revenue, and thus some users decide to quit system. From Fig. 3(b), when h increases, the user
access probability decreases, for example, when h increases by 60% and N > 40, the user access
probability drops to 0, i.e., the mobile blockchain system crashes dramatically. This is because
as h increases, the difficulty of mining block in the mobile blockchain network increases, and
thus more users cannot deal with PoW puzzle and then quit system. When N is large, or B is
small, or h is large, the mobile blockchain system is highly competitive and less benefit, and
thus the user access probability will be low and even the entire system will crash.
In this paper, we mainly investigate the Case 1, where we analyze the optimal number
of nonces selected by each user and the specific mathematical relationship with all system
parameters when the system parameters are fixed. Some possible problems in the other two
cases, such as how to dynamically adjust the system parameters, and how to design the incentive
mechanism for solving the problem of system crashing, are not analyze theoretically in this paper.
These may be important research topics in the future.
Here, we will consider a special case, where we assume to know the average block size of all
mobile users and let s¯ denotes the fixed average block size. Then we can rewrite the expression
(26 ) simply as
M∗i =
⌊
N − 1
N
B + rs¯
c · 2h
(
1− N − 1
N
)⌋
, (27)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . From expression (27), we can achieve that user’s nonce selection strategy only
depends on the total number of users N , when others parameters B, r, c, h are fixed in the whole
untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain network. Moreover, we can obtain that the i-th user’s
nonce selection strategy approaches to 0 when N is sufficiently large. In this case, all players
are trying to select nonces as much as possible, severe competition for a large number of users
often leads to low computing resource allocation. Since the untrusted MEC server coexists over
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a long period of time, the user’s nonce selection game will be played for multiple times, where
the unfair competition could be handled through mutual trust and cooperation. By repeating a
game over multiple time, the players can be conscious of the previous behavior of the players
and change their strategies accordingly. Next, we use the repeated game to boost cooperation
among competitive players.
C. Analysis by Using Repeated Game
Let T be number of stage of the game G. The repeated game, denoted by GT , consists of
game G repeated for T + 1 time slots form t = 0 until t = T . First of all, we have to define
the utility for a player i in the finitely repeated game (FRG) (T <∞) is expressed as
Ui =
T∑
t=0
δtui [t]
=
T∑
t=0
δt
(B + rsi) 2−h Mi (t)∑
j∈N
Mj (t)
− cMi (t)
 ∀i ∈ N , (28)
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor, and ui [t] is player i’s payoff at the t-th time slot. When δ
is closer to 1, the player is more patient.
Theorem 4. Consider FRG GT , and the one-shot stage game G has a unique nonce selection
strategy M∗. Then GT has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). In this unique SPE,
there is Mt = M∗ for each t = 0, 1, .., T regardless of history.
Proof. By using backward induction, in the last stage T , we will have MT = M∗ regardless of
the history of the FRG. Then we can inversely move to the previous stage T − 1, the sub-game
also has MT −1 = M∗. With this argument and continuing inductively, we can know that in this
repeated game GT of complete information, there exists Mt = M∗ for t = 0, 1, .., T regardless
of history.
Thus, FRG is impossible to bring cooperative behavior among players, because we expect the
emergence of cooperative behavior in the infinitely repeated games (IRG), denoted by G∞. Then
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we define the utility for a player i in the IRG (T =∞) is calculated as
Ui = (1− δ)
+∞∑
t=0
δtui [t]
= (1− δ)
+∞∑
t=0
δt
(B + rsi) 2−h Mi (t)∑
j∈N
Mj (t)
− cMi (t)
, ∀i ∈ N , (29)
where the factor 1− δ is introduced as a normalization, to measure stage and repeated game
utilities in the same units. In this IRG, we consider a cooperation behavior to maximize the total
utility function for all players which is given by
max
M1,M2,...,MN
utotal =
N∑
i=1
(B + rsi) 2−h Mi∑
j∈N
Mj
− cMi

s.t. Mi > 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., N.
(30)
The above optimization problem (30) is multiple variables non-convex problem. This optimiza-
tion problem is more difficult to solve. Here, we only need simple analysis, therefore, there is
no request to address this problem. Here, we simulate individual revenues of three player in the
untrusted MEC-aided mobile blockchain network by using the cooperative or non-cooperative
behaviors, as shown in Fig. 4, where the parameter settings are consistent with the later simulation
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Section V. Firstly, we can see that the total revenue of the cooperative behavior in IRG is much
higher than that of the non-cooperative behavior in one-shot game. While the individual revenues
of player 1 and player 2 according to the cooperation in repeated games do not achieve a higher
revenue than using the one-shot non-cooperative game. Consequently, these players will not want
cooperation with other players in the repeated game. By cooperation, the individual revenues of
each player do not increase together, therefore, the repeated game is not appropriate to analyze
user’s nonce selection in the mobile blockchain network. Moreover, if the block size si for all
players is the same, i.e., s1 = s2 = ... = sN , the optimization problem (30) will be a linear
problem. In this case, all user’s nonce selection strategies are approximately equal to 0, which
does not accord with the actual situation. This further illustrates that cooperation approach of
the repeated game is not feasible for IoT users in blockchain networks.
D. Blockchain’s Difficulty Adjustment
Too high or too low difficulty can bring about different mining time. The blockchain network
desires to ensure a stable average block time over long periods of time. For the sake of making the
blockchain network run smoothly, the design of blockchain’s difficulty adjustment is necessary.
Next, we will focus more on blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism. We assume that
the time for once nonce hash computing is t0 and the total nonce number denotes as M =
M1 +M2 + ...+MN for a round of interaction between MEC server and mobile users. From the
above analysis for user’s nonce selection strategies in non-cooperative game G, we can obtain
the total expected optimal nonce number by
M =
N − 1∑
j∈N
c·2h
B+rsj
. (31)
In one interaction, the longest time during MEC providing computing service to users process
is t0M . Each nonce hash computing is i.i.d. Bernoulli trial with the same successful probability,
i.e., p = PD, so the expected time from starting nonce hash computing to the successful mining
can yield
E (p) =
+∞∑
k=1
t0k(1− p)k−1p
= lim
K→+∞
t0
(
1− (1− p)K
p
−K(1− p)K
)
=
t0
p
,
(32)
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where k is the number of nonces, and K denotes the upper bound of its number. Hence users
may need to selected nonces according to multiple rounds of interaction between MEC server
and users, so that block will be mined successfully. Let R is the interaction rounds of mining
a new block between MEC server and users, and R should satisfy the following inequality,
t0MR ≥ t0
p
, (33)
Then we obtain
Rmin =
∑
j∈N
c·4h
B+rsj
N − 1 , (34)
where Rmin is the minimum interaction rounds between MEC server and users for mining a new
block. Here, we consider that a round time including the hash computing time and transmission
time between MEC and users are almost the same. It is assumed that a round time β is fixed
for the interaction process between users selecting nonces and MEC server providing computing
service. Then the actual minimum time to mine a new block is
Ta = βRmin. (35)
So we keep the threshold number of rounds Rth fixed in the process of adjusting the difficulty,
which is equivalent to keeping the block time unchanged. Next, we are mainly interested in the
average rounds for mining G blocks, then we can obtain
R¯ = 1
G
G∑
g=1
Rg =
1
G
G∑
g=1

∑
j∈N
c·4h
B+rsj(g)
N − 1
, (36)
where Rg denotes the interaction rounds between MEC server and all IoT devices for mining
g-th new block. The variance of rounds for mining G blocks is given as
var (R) = 1
G
G∑
g=1
 1
G
G∑
g=1

∑
j∈N
c·4h
B+rsj(g)
N − 1
 −
∑
j∈N
c·4h
B+rsj(g)
N − 1

2
. (37)
From the above expression, we can see that the variance of rounds only depends on the number
of mining blocks when other parameters are constant. Particularly, the variance of these rounds
will become worse with smaller block cycle G. Then, the rule of difficulty adjustment factor h
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is to minimize the distance between the average rounds for G blocks in (36) and the threshold
rounds Rth as follows
hˆ = arg min
h
∣∣R¯ − Rth∣∣
= arg min
h
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
G
G∑
g=1

∑
j∈N
c·4h
B+rsj(g)
N − 1
−Rth
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(38)
When R¯ = Rth, then the optimal difficulty adjustment factor h∗ is expressed as follows
h∗ =
1
2
log
(N − 1)GRth
G∑
g=1
(∑
j∈N
c
B+rsj(g)
) , (39)
where the si(g) may change for mining different blocks. Eventually, combining the above analysis
part, we update the difficulty factor h based on previous G blocks. We propose the blockchain’s
difficulty adjustment mechanism to be summarized as follows.
• Step 1: Start with an initial difficulty factor h0, yielding the initial rounds according to
equation (34).
• Step 2: Keep h0 constant over the difficulty adjustment interval of G blocks. The average
number of rounds can be obtained by (36).
• Step 3: After G blocks, use adjustment rule (38) to update the difficulty factor h, then get
a new h∗ according to (39).
• Step 4: Repeat this process with h∗ as initial difficulty factor.
It is easy to see that we will increase the difficulty factor h if the average rounds of mining
the previous G blocks are shorter than Rth, and decrease the difficulty factor h if the average
rounds of mining the previous G blocks are longer thanRth. According to this proposed difficulty
adjustment mechanism, the blockchain network can keep block times stable during a long period
of time.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate simulation results to justify the effectiveness of our proposed
nonce ordering algorithm in untrusted MEC PoW scheme, evaluate the expected optimal user’s
nonce selection strategies and the performance of blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism.
Here, we consider a group of 3 users and each user’s block size si is uniformly distributed
over (0, 1024], for i = 1, 2, 3. The default parameter values are presented as follows: B = 104,
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Fig. 5. Comparison of target and actual probability distribution by Algorithm 1 and WRR
algorithm.
r = 2, c = 0.001, and h = 12. Note that some of these system parameters are varied in different
simulation scenarios.
A. Proposed Nonce Ordering Algorithm
First of all, in order to verify the rationality of the our proposed ordering algorithm, i.e., for
any position in the merged sequence by using Algorithm 1, the number of selected nonces of
each original sequence is proportional to its nonce length, we consider to compare the target
and actual probability distribution. Without loss of generality, we assume only three users in the
mobile blockchain system and submitted nonce numbers have a fixed proportion as M1 : M2 :
M3 = 1 : 3 : 6, i.e., the target probability distribution is P = (0.1, 0.3, 0.6), while the total nonce
numbers M = M1 +M2 +M3 is changed. We compare our proposed ordering Algorithm 1 with
weighted round robin (WRR) algorithm, where the weights of user 1, user 2 and user 3 are 1,
3 and 6, respectively.
Fig. 5 reveals the comparison of target and actual probability distribution by Algorithm 1
and WRR algorithm. Here, we take the first 0.2M and 0.5M nonces of the merged sequence
in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), respectively. By using Algorithm 1, it can be observed that actual
probability has a little error with target probability when M is small and then it approaches or
even equals the target probability for all three users when M increases in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b).
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The reason why the performance of Algorithm 1 is not good when the total nonce number M
is small, and then the nonce length of each user is smaller. For example, if M = 10, user 1 has
only one nonce and then we take any position of the merged sequence to verify the rationality of
the ordering algorithm. The selected probability of user 1 mostly is 0, not the target probability
0.1. Moreover, because of the large amount of nonce computing in the blockchain network (e.g.,
the SHA-256 hash function commonly used by Bitcoin requires 232 nonce hash computing),
the shortcoming of Algorithm 1 can be ignored when M is small. When the total nonce length
approaches infinity, the user’s successful mining probability is nearest to the target probability.
On the other hand, the fairness performance of the WRR algorithm is significantly worse than
that of Algorithm 1, the WRR algorithm becomes better with the increment of M , however,
the convergence of WRR algorithm is still poor due to the limitations of the WRR algorithm.
For example, by using WRR algorithm, the user 3 with a high weight is always selected until
the number of weights is reached, and then the next user 1 will be selected. This implies that
the service is consecutively provided on the same user 3, resulting in the next user 1 with a
low weight may be idle and having no smooth resource allocation. By comparing Fig. 5(a) and
Fig. 5(b), it can be see that our proposed nonce ordering algorithm, Algorithm 1, can provide a
much fairer hash computing service for all users than the WRR algorithm.
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B. Nonce Selection Strategies of Users
We assume that only two users in this MEC-aided mobile blockchain network and the param-
eters of block size are s1 = 100 and s2 = 200. To find the NE we construct the best response
functions by (14), for every player i, i = 1, 2, the best response functions can be obtained by
using (18)
R1 (M2) =
√
M2 (B + rs1)
c · 2h −M2, (40)
R2 (M1) =
√
M1 (B + rs2)
c · 2h −M1. (41)
In Fig. 6, we plot the best response functions of the players in (40) and (41). We can observe
from Fig. 6 that the best response function R1 associates a unique strategy for player 1 to each
strategy of player 2. Similarly, the best response function R2 associates a unique strategy for
player 2 to each strategy of player 1. As shown in Fig. 6, the two best response functions intersect
at a unique point (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ). In fact, this point constitutes the unique pure-strategy NE of the
non-cooperative game, at this point, every player’s nonce selection strategy is the best response
to the other player’s strategies, i.e., M∗1 = R1(M
∗
2 ) and M
∗
2 = R2(M
∗
1 ). Thus we can conclude
that this non-cooperative game exists a unique NE. Moreover, we can see that the player’s nonce
length decreases for remaining own revenue when other users’ length is larger than their best
strategy. These simulation results are consistent with the above NE analysis in Section IV-B.
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To demonstrate the performance of the proposed optimization algorithm of user’s nonce
selection and the impacts of various parameters on the nonce selection strategies, we consider
three users in this MEC-aided mobile blockchain system with the following parameters of
block size: s1 = 100, s2 = 200, s3 = 300. First, the convergence performance of the proposed
alternating optimization algorithm of user’s nonce selection is depicted in Fig. 7. We can see that
nonce length of Algorithm 2 is unstable in the first 4 iterations. When the iteration is larger than 4,
the alternating Algorithm 2 reaches a stable state and the gap between the proposed alternating
Algorithm 2 and the analytical solution is rather small for all users, which verifies the good
convergence of our proposed Algorithm 2 and the correctness of Theorem 3 about analytical
expression (21). The impacts of several parameters including fixed reward and transaction fee
rate on user’s nonce selection strategies are investigated in Fig. 8-9. We illustrate nonce lengths
for all users versus the fixed reward for successfully mining in Fig. 8. We observed that the
optimal nonce lengths for all users increase with the increment of fixed reward. Because of the
fixed reward ascending, all users have greater incentives to cause higher nonce hash computing
demand. Next, Fig. 9 illustrates nonce lengths for all users versus the transaction fee rate. We
can see that the optimal nonce lengths for user 2 and user 3 raise with the transaction fee
rate ascending. Nevertheless, the optimal nonce length for user 1 reduces with the increment of
transaction fee rate. This reason is that the transaction fee rate increases, the incentive of each
user are greater to have higher nonce hash computing demand. But the incentives of user 1 with
smaller block size are still not much as that of user 2 and user 3, and becomes smaller than that
of user 2 and user 3 when the transaction fee rate increases.
C. Difficulty’s Adjustment Mechanism
In the end, to display the performance of the proposed blockchain’s difficulty adjustment
mechanism, we plot the block time versus the block number for G = 10 and G = 2 in
Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b), respectively. Here, we assume that each round time β of the interaction
process between MEC server and users is set to 120s and the target time of mining a block is
denoted as βRth = 600s for Bitcoin system. Note that blue ’*’ represents individual block times,
and the red line presents the average block time within G block intervals. Firstly, in Fig. 10,
though the individual block time reveals a random property, the gap between the individual block
time and the target time is within one minute, which ensures the effectiveness of our proposed
difficulty adjustment mechanism. As observed from Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b), we can see that
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Fig. 10. Block time versus the block number.
average block times fluctuate around the target time 600s every G block intervals, because
the blockchain’s difficulty factor h updates every G blocks by using the proposed blockchain’s
difficulty adjustment mechanism. Meanwhile, the variance between the average block time and
the target time of G = 2 in Fig. 10(b) is significantly larger than that of G = 10 in Fig. 10(a),
which is also consistent with the theoretical results of the above expression (37). We can see
that the variance of these block times for smaller G becomes particularly worse than larger G.
Accordingly, we should select the appropriate block intervals in the process of adjusting the
blockchain’s difficulty value.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the untrusted MEC PoW scheme in the mobile blockchain-
enabled IoT network. We have proposed a nonce ordering algorithm in this scheme, which
guarantees that the number of selected nones of each original sequence is proportional to its nonce
length for any position in the merged sequence. Then, the user’s nonce selection strategies have
been analyzed by using a non-cooperative game, and the NE has been considered as the solution.
Furthermore, we have illustrated that cooperation approach of the repeated game is not feasible
for IoT users in blockchain networks. Finally, we have designed the blockchain’s difficulty
adjustment mechanism to keep block times stable during a long period of time. Simulation results
indicate that the nonce ordering algorithm can allocate computing resource of the untrusted MEC
29
server more fairly. The mobile IoT users can achieve optimal nonce selection strategies and we
have verified that the proposed blockchain’s difficulty adjustment mechanism is effective.
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